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NHBD = nonheart-beating organ donation; OPO = organ procurement organization.
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NHBD is currently a source of considerable ethical
controversy. Two organ recovery procedures are described
[1]: ‘uncontrolled’ NHBD, in which organs are recovered
from a cardiac arrest patient who fails attempts at
resuscitation; and ‘controlled’ NHBD, in which organs are
recovered after life support is withdrawn (as portrayed in the
following case). Standardized protocols for NHBD have been
developed and are being put into practice in parts of the
United States and parts of Europe [1].
While the details of these protocols vary, they all typically
include a waiting time after asystole occurs, commonly
ranging from 2 to 5 min [1,2]. This waiting time is meant to
preclude any possibility of spontaneous return of circulation
and to allow death to be pronounced with confidence [1,2].
After death is pronounced, organs must be procured as
rapidly as possible to reduce the deleterious effect of warm
ischemia, which begins as soon as the heart stops beating
[3]. This need for speed gives rise to an even more
heightened sense of urgency than seen in organ donation
from brain-dead patients.
It is estimated that NHBD can result in a 25% increase in the
number of organs available for transplant [4]. This is a
considerable increase at the present time, where the need for
organs far surpasses availability and many people die while
on the waiting lists. However, even though decreasing the
shortage of organs is an obvious benefit, does this mean we
should embrace NHBD with open arms? What are the
ethical issues that we need to consider? Finally, should
NHBD be ethically acceptable?
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Abstract
This pro/con debate explores the ethical issues surrounding nonheart-beating organ donation (NHBD),
a source of considerable controversy. It is estimated that NHBD can increase the number of organs
available for transplant by 25% at a time of great need. However, should NHBD be ethically
acceptable? In support of NHBD, it may be acceptable practice if there is a separation of the rationale
to withdraw life support/to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from the decision to recover organs,
if no conflicts of interest exist, if a waiting time precluding spontaneous return of circulation is included,
and if NHBD conforms to a standardized protocol. Against NHBD, there are questions regarding the
ambiguity and cultural perspectives of death, regarding whether a separation of rationale between
withdrawal and donation is sufficient to preclude conflicts of interest, and regarding whether variable
protocols arise that subordinate the patient to the goal of donation. Such concerns suggest NHBD
may damage the trust in patient–physician relationships and may adversely affect organ donation rates.
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Pro: NHBD is ethically acceptable
Leslie Whetstine
The scenario describes the controversial organ recovery
procedure known as ‘controlled’ NHBD. Those who criticize
this procedure practice level, ethically convincing arguments
against it that demand serious consideration by clinicians.
Criticizers have argued that NHBD may be a violation of the
‘dead donor’ rule, which stipulates that persons may not be
killed for their organs or by the removal of their organs [2].
They have suggested that it may directly or indirectly endorse
a species of self-indulgent utilitarianism [5]. And, perhaps
most importantly, criticizers have argued that NHBD may
undermine societal trust in the justness of the medical
establishment’s decision-making process, thereby
jeopardizing future organ donation [6].
Superficially, these may be valid concerns. If, however,
NHBD is scrupulously managed so that it conforms to an
appropriate and standardized protocol, a number of ethicists
believe it can be legitimately applied. Mr Henry’s case is an
example of how, with the application of such an appropriate
protocol, NHBD can be an ethically acceptable practice
holding much promise for the future.
In the USA, The Uniform Determination of Death Act
specifies that death may be declared after appropriate
diagnostic tests establish either “irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions” or “irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem” [7]. Although the majority of organ donors are
classified as ‘heart beating’ (brain dead) by the second
criterion, donors classified as ‘nonheart beating’ fall under the
first criterion. Naturally, there is a sense of urgency in NHBD
that is not present in the case of heart-beating donors. The
haste required to recover viable organs begs the question of
whether the patient is truly ‘dead’ yet. Can it be said that
circulation and respiratory function have been irreversibly lost
in these patients?
To obey the dead donor rule, NHBD protocols typically
include a waiting time after the declaration of death to begin
organ recovery. There was a 5-min wait protocol in
Mr Henry’s case, following which the absence of circulatory
or respiratory function assures death.
Although there has not been a sufficient number of studies to
declare diagnostic certainty, there are no empirical data in
the literature suggesting that autoresuscitation has ever been
observed unexpectedly after 1 min of pulselessness [8].
Therefore, as a practical matter, waiting 5 min virtually
eliminates the possibility of unexpected autoresuscitation,
especially within this population of patients who have been
selected for severe organ system dysfunction [2]. It is
important to remember that this population of potential
donors have been aggressively evaluated for any survival
potential and failed long before they were assigned to
potential donor status [8]. These are not fresh, cold water
drowning victims or patients that have taken an overdose of
barbiturates who can give the superficial appearance of
death but who are in fact resuscitable.
The scenario
Mr Robert Henry is a 45-year-old corporate executive who,
while preparing to go to work, complains of a severe
headache and collapses in front of his wife. As he is brought
into the emergency room, he is seizing. He is quickly given
intravenous midazolam and phenytoin, and he is intubated. A
computerized tomography scan reveals a devastating
subarachnoid hemorrhage. Neurosurgery is consulted, but in
their opinion the patient will never regain consciousness and
neither an angiogram nor an operating room will be of
benefit. Mr Henry has a living will stipulating that he is not to
be kept alive on life support in the event of severe brain
injury. After extensive discussions with the intensivist and the
neurosurgeon, his wife and family agree to withdraw him from
life support. At this time, Mr Henry is not brain dead.
The hospital has a NHBD protocol that mandates that the
intensivist should contact the organ procurement
organization (OPO) whenever life support is withdrawn.
Mr Henry meets their criteria for NHBD, and the OPO
approaches his wife and family about donation. The wife
consents to NHBD after further discussions with the OPO
and the intensivist, even though Mr Henry had never
discussed his thoughts on the issue, since donation would
mean some ‘good’ could come from this devastating event.
Premortem central venous cannulation is required in NHBD
to infuse organ preserving solution and heparin (unless
contraindicated). Separate consents for NHBD, cannulation
and heparinization must be obtained from the family. Heparin
is contraindicated in this case since it would worsen the
subarachnoid hemorrhage.
The central line is inserted. Mr Henry is taken to the
operating room with his family in attendance. He is
extubated, and narcotics and benzodiazepines are given to
palliate his dyspnea and his discomfort. Death is
pronounced and, after a period of 5 min of asystole, of an
absence of a pulse and blood pressure via the arterial
catheter or noninvasive blood pressure monitor and of an
absence of respirations, the preserving solution is infused
via the central line. His wife and family leave the operating
room and his organs are harvested.Critical Care    June 2002 Vol 6 No 3 Whetstine et al.
Con: NHBD is not ethically acceptable
Kerry Bowman
New criteria of death have been evolving in industrialized,
Western nations over the past 30 years. NHBD is an
extension of this process and may soon be fully integrated into
clinical practice to increase kidney and liver donation given
the increasing number of patients waiting for an organ
transplant. The case of Mr Henry highlights many of the social
and ethical questions associated with this emerging practice.
Mr Henry left no explicit wishes for organ donation (NHBD)
or premortum canulation. Although substitute decision-
making is considered legally and ethically acceptable, these
are profound, far-reaching choices given that Mr Henry’s
preferences are unknown. Premortem cannulation is of no
benefit to Mr Henry and may be painful.
It is a common recommendation for such decisions to be
made on a case-by-case basis, balancing clinical and ethical
factors. I find this too vague and equivocal. Is it justified to
administer a procedure to a prospective donor, such as
Mr Henry, that has no value for his treatment or comfort, and
in some cases (probably not this one) may hasten that
person’s death? Premortem cannulation is carried out to
ensure the organs are treated to keep them optimally viable
for transplantation. Caring for Mr Henry becomes
subordinate to this goal.
Many health care workers agree that NHBD can be ethically
justified if there is a separation of the rationale to withdraw
care from the indication to recover organs [11]. The key is to
ensure that NHBD organ donation is not allowed to cloud the
decision to withdraw treatment or to cloud the actual events
around the death of a patient. It is not always enough to
simply ask attending physicians to make end-of-life decisions
before contacting organ-harvesting teams. The demands for
organs and the expectation to identify potential sources can
be strong and they may well affect the decision to withdraw
care. In the case of Mr Henry (and many NHBDs, I would
argue), the process and perhaps even the timing of death is
indeed shaped by the process of NHBD, even in the
absence of a patient-advanced directive, as we see with
Mr Henry.
Perhaps the greatest ethical question with NHBD is what is
the period of suspension between life and death? Many
people and cultures do not accept the concept of brain
death [12,13], and in Western cultures the duration of the
absence of circulation before the person is dead is not well
defined. Anxieties about the ambiguity between life and death
have deep cultural roots in many societies, appearing in
mythology and in folk stories, and they surface in documents
from medieval times. Studies have shown that many
In the USA, people have the right to refuse any and all
treatment, and they do not forfeit that right if they become
incapacitated [9]. In addition, incapacitated patients may
elect to forgo life-sustaining treatments through a designated
surrogate decision-maker. Under current ethical and legal
rationale, therefore, resuscitative measures may not be
initiated if they have been proscribed by a patient or by a
surrogate [10]. The patient’s autonomous decision to forgo
further treatment trumps the issue of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation to assure completeness during the NHBD
protocol, and in so doing renders moot the theoretical
possibility that cardiopulmonary resuscitation may be able to
resume viability. Furthermore, although total brain failure is
not the criterion used to declare death in NHBD, data
support the fact that neurologic function rapidly ceases
within seconds of circulatory collapse, rendering this criterion
clinically moot as well [8].
The nuts and bolts of NHBD protocols vary widely
throughout American medical centers. This variability is
ethically dubious and should be standardized to assure
uniformity. Toward this end, in the USA, the Institute of
Medicine published a report in 1997 offering
recommendations and practical guidelines regarding NHBD
[1]. The Institute of Medicine recommends seven key points
for model NHBD protocols, including that the protocols be
locally drafted and approved, that they have safeguards
against conflicts of interest, and that they contain a waiting
period of 5 min after death before organ recovery, as verified
by electrocardiographic and arterial pressure monitoring.
Mr Henry’s case aligns with these Institute of Medicine
recommendations. The decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment was made independently of the decision to donate
organs, assuaging fears that potential organ donors might
receive less than aggressive care. The physician who
certified death was not part of the OPO, eliminating some
potential conflicts of interest. The elapsed time frame of
5 min was recorded through accurate monitoring modalities,
testifying that the dead donor rule was not circumvented or
violated. This scenario raises some concerns for purists but,
when adequately explored, it is clear that this protocol is in
accordance with accepted canons of clinical medicine.
We know that, following circulatory respiratory failure, the
human organism as an integrated unit suffers rapid
fragmentation and expires quickly. The precise moment of
death eludes detection by current medical and philosophical
analyses. When properly managed, NHBD is not quiescent
acceptance of Machiavellian ends justifying means simply
because the proportional good exceeds risk. If we desire to
realize the benefits of organ transplantation, we must
necessarily accept our limitations while using our best clinical
and moral judgments to guide this altruistic practice.Available online http://ccforum.com/content/6/3/192
Japanese believe that there is a liminal, a dangerous time of
transition, between the time when biological death occurs
and the time when the transformation necessary to become
an ancestor occurs [14]. In many nonWestern cultures, death
is viewed as a social event rather than a scientific
phenomenon [15]. It is not surprising that such questions
evoke strong reactions in people. Recognizing these deep-
rooted concerns is critical to developing policies that are
respectful to the diverse, pluralistic societies we value and
live within.
Even within the culture of Western health care, death means
different things to different people and different institutions.
The debate and variation over how many minutes ‘define’
death before NHBD can be performed clearly indicates that
we are drawing the lines in different places. Can this variation
be justified to the public? The present lack of uniformity in
protocols means that, at least in theory, there could be two
similar patients whose hearts have stopped. In one case
doctors might perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and in
the other they might proceed with recovering organs.
As these matters now stand, an impression can easily arise
that a patient on whom NHBD is performed is not really dead
or that the patient has been prematurely withdrawn from
ventilators so that organs can be extracted. Even if such a
suspicion is slight, this is a significant cause for concern.
NHBD may both damage the fragile trust between patients
and doctors and damage the public’s trust in organ donation,
which is already poor [16].
It is imperative as health care workers to remember that,
although death may seem self-evident from a medical/clinical
perspective, we work for the public, and to remember that
the views of the broader population are of critical importance.
We know from the social sciences that space between life
and death is historically and culturally constructed, fluid and
open to dispute [17]. Death can never be understood merely
as a biological event; cultural, legal, and political dimensions
are inevitably implicated in its definition.
The public is already ambivalent about the circumstances of
organ procurement [16],and evidence exists that the public
has even greater discomfort with NHBD [18]. From what is
known of the present case, I am not convinced that we can
truly assure the family and friends of patients such as
Mr Henry that his death has not been influenced by the
decision to harvest his organs. Can we honestly tell the
public that the various considerations that were weighed in
his last days were not merely utilitarian? I believe cases such
as that of Mr Henry, and NHBD in general, require greater
public discourse and social and ethical exploration.
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